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"Captain, I can tell you how many bridges have been built, the progress of infrastructure programs, schools built, and a whole host of other conventional measures of effectiveness. What I am most concerned with are the things we have a hard time measuring; the attitudes and moods of the Iraqi people. The Iraqi people will decide the fate of their nation" State-building depends on a vast array of factors but if leading indicators can be developed and practically applied that point to identifiable outcomes, decision makers can make more effective resource allocation choices. State-building by the United States has a long history which has not always been successful. This paper proposes measures of effectiveness for progress toward the stated objectives in Iraq. To some readers these measures will seem to be rather unconventional but I believe they are in fact sound, practical indicators as to the probability for a successful end state in Iraq. I argue that intuitive and anecdotal measures of effectiveness provide better indicators of progress in Iraq than more traditional measures of effectiveness typically based on quantifiable measurements. Each proposed measure of effectiveness presented in this paper is directly tied to a goal for the rebuilding of Iraq as established by the NCA and the State Department.
Addressed in this paper are the problems and issues of state-building, not those of nation building. Nations are not built, they grow over time. History shows us that a nation may take centuries to form and no new self governing state becomes a nation overnight.
State-building has been successful in some instances where the conditions were conducive to the mission and in most cases had plenty of support from neighboring states. 4 There are achievable state-building goals that are within reach and decision makers need to make crucial decisions in the near term about the paths to these goals, decisions that must be informed by practical measures of effectiveness. The primary reason to develop good measures of effectiveness is to facilitate the decisions required for properly investing resources. These measures should also be used to evaluate if a real impact was made and to know when the effort has produced the desired results. There will obviously be times where resources will be shifted from one priority to another. Some programs or institutions may become self-sustaining at which time it may be prudent to shift resources. Decision makers will always be looking for the right point to reduce presence without setting the state up for future failure.
State-building can be a predecessor to nation building. Since World War II the United
States has been involved in everything from rebuilding successful nation states such as Germany and Japan to attempting to build a basic working state infrastructure in Somalia and Afghanistan which, arguably, have never constituted states. 5 In some cases the U.S. has tried to build a basic democratic functioning state while in others the attempt has been to build a functioning economic and political structure. "The cases of Germany and Japan set a standard for post-conflict nation-building that has not since been matched. For the next 40 years, there were few attempts to replicate these early successes. During the Cold War, U.S.
policy emphasized containment, deterrence, and maintenance of the status quo. Efforts were made to promote democratic and free market values but generally without the element of compulsion." 6 The U.S. has dealt with failed states or states that needed to be rebuilt in a variety of ways with different agendas, but it seems that the only consistent factor has been that all state-building attempts have been costly endeavors.
In both Somalia and Haiti the U.S. entered the operations with limited objectives. It soon found that many more resources were needed than those initially allocated to achieve those limited objectives. Perhaps in the cold light of day, the objectives really were not so limited after all. In Somalia the humanitarian goals the U.S. set became too expensive in terms of men and treasure. With the help of the U.S.'s European allies, in Bosnia the goal was to obtain a multiethnic state which might provide some useful information for building a multiethnic state in Iraq. "In Iraq, the United States has taken on the task with a scope comparable to the transformational attempts still under way in Bosnia and Kosovo and a scale comparable only to the earlier U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan. Nation-building it appears, is the inescapable responsibility of the world's only superpower."
7 "According to the great German sociologist Max Weber, states are institutions that exert a monopoly over the legitimate means of violence in a given territory." 8 U.S. policy makers have obviously asked the COCOM to do much more than simply insure that the new Iraqi state is the legitimate means of violence within its borders. 9 The President has stated that he wants Iraq to be a fully functioning democratic state which will be a shining example for other states in the Middle East. In order to meet the President's objectives the COCOM has some very ambitious goals, which at the very least will take a lot of time, effort, money and unfortunately a significant loss of life.
Success in state building is largely dependent on the amount of money and commitment that a state building nation puts toward the program. 10 Per Capita external assistance has varied greatly from state-building efforts in Germany and Japan to Bosnia and Kosovo. 11 The key will always be to make the right allocation in regard to the internal environment. Today the Congressional Budget Office predicts that the cost of rebuilding Iraq will cost between 100 and 150 billion dollars making it the most costly reconstruction effort in history-this for a country with the population roughly the size of California's. 12 Even with substantial oil revenue the Iraqi government is projected to run a deficit for years to come.
Every stated objective for post war Iraq will be a politically charged issue because of the high cost in money and men both directly and counted in terms of opportunity costs and long-term effects on the military. Each state building attempt inevitably has unique characteristics; however, there appears to be several basic objectives the U.S. is working towards in Iraq.
1. Iraq must be able to protect itself from foreign intervention both externally and internally. 4. A democratic form of government is the preferred system for which the U.S. has attempted laid the groundwork for in Iraq.
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Beyond these basic objectives, there are other intermediate and long term goals which will have to be met to reach these broad objectives, such as a functioning health care system and a primary educational program. Some feel that the Iraqi "military, security services, and bureaucracy need to be radically reformed and purged" in order to make Iraq an effective functioning state.
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As it embarks on its most ambitious program of nation-building since 1945, the United States can learn important lessons from history. It has staked its credibility on a successful outcome in Iraq. This will require an extensive commitment of financial, personnel, and diplomatic resources over a long period of time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed. The real question for the United States should not be how soon it can leave, but rather how fast and how much to share power with Iraqis and the international community while retaining enough power to to oversee an enduring transition to democracy and stability. 18 State-building is not a race to see how fast a nation can extract itself from the state that is being built. "There is no quick route to nation building. Five years seems to be the minimum required to enforce an enduring transition to democracy." In the past, analysts might simply have asked how much the government built grid is producing without asking the why and how questions. As the Iraqi economy grows, the increased demand for electricity will dictate the need. If Iraqi citizens were able to buy into the program and invest in their future it might provide a more accurate way to really measure and gauge Iraqi involvement and commitment. Internal and external investment can really gauge commitment to the long term program.
An intuitive look at the Iraqi power grid might be a night satellite picture to see where the electricity is being used and by whom (by recording lighting). Low earth orbit satellites can detect activity on the ground. 24 Economic activity based on observable events by the satellites may be useful when describing the macro picture. 25 Satellites can also pick up smoke which might be an indicator of industrial activity. Satellite data combined with other measures of effectiveness probably give a better overall economic picture of the situation in Iraq than just one stand alone indicator.
It is not only important to analysis the correct measures of effectiveness, it is just as important to address the most pressing needs first. Water and sanitation are basic needs that must be met immediately. There is a direct cause and effect relationship between safe drinking water/good sanitation and health. It would be illuminating to note how the Iraqis now obtain their potable water and the real status of the sanitation facilities around the nation. Bechtel reports that major water and sanitation programs need to be improved around
Baghdad and Basra at the cost of more than 3 billion dollars. 26 As one would expect, anecdotal evidence points to a wide spectrum in the quality of the water and sanitation systems throughout the country. The bottom line is that the vast majority of Iraqis are making do with what they have but the situation could be drastically improved with some resources placed in the right areas. Health costs are directly tied to this program and the amount of resources spent on the Iraqi health system could be substantial. Careful analysis of water and sanitation indicators must be in the forefront to prevent future issues.
The Congressional Budget office predicts that it will take over $6.8 billion, to restore the Iraqi water and sanitation sector to pre-1991 levels and then even more money to improve the program for an expanding population. 27 The World Bank reports that in 2004 the demand for safe water and sanitation exceeds the available supply. 28 Little of Iraq's water and sanitation was damaged in the recent conflict; its problems resulted from the 1990-1991 Gulf War, long-term neglect by the Hussein regime, and looting after the recent conflict. One conventional measure of effectiveness that gets a lot of play in the press is the number of attacks against coalition forces. The number and human toll of the attacks may not be a good indicator of success. Some believe that as the terrorists observe that their country is moving into a more stable phase it may be important to the insurgents to increase the amount of violence to bring attention to their cause. Obviously, it would be better without the attacks but one must be careful as to how to judge the effect on the overall picture in Iraq. Some would argue that neighboring powers in the Middle East have a vested interest in keeping Iraq unstable in order to further their own goals in the region and have been known to sponsor terrorist acts. Iraqis have recently held demonstrations renouncing terrorist acts within their country which may be an indicator of a national consensus against these violent acts. Another indicator of success against the insurgents might very well be how many private citizens are turning in insurgents to local authorities. 32 When people value their environment and want to make it better it really means that they have a stake in the future of that environment.
Another very powerful indicator of Iraqi sentiment may be "actionable intelligence"
provided by the local population. "The higher the percentage, the greater the likelihood that the locals share our objectives and feel secure enough to volunteer information. The goal here, of course, is to determine whether two key objectives are being met. First, are the Iraqi forces taking an increasing share of the burden in the war against the insurgents? Second, what kind of cooperation are they receiving from the people in terms of actionable intelligence? If the trends are positive, it offers considerable encouragement." 33 In the long run it is Iraqis that will have to fight the insurgents for the right reasons. In the past there has been evidence that some attacks against coalition forces were cash transactions between insurgent true believers and mercenaries out to make a profit. An intuitive look at this dynamic would measure whether the cost of third party or mercenary activity was on the rise; the true believer insurgent would find it more difficult to recruit people who would want to become involved which would be a good sign for the pro-government forces. People usually value their own self interest when looking at options which could have a drastic effect on their lives.
The current monetary unit in Iraq is the new dinar which is tied to the U.S. dollar.
Currency speculators have made the dinar move in value in relation to other currencies over the past year so it would be very hard to tell if the value of the dinar was an indicator of a more prosperous country. 34 There is an indicator that more and more Iraqi citizens are using the currency for everyday transactions. 35 As time passes the dinar may be an accurate indicator of the value the international community puts in the future of Iraq by watching how the currency is valued on the free market as compared to other local Middle East currencies.
It has been noted that some foreigners have arrived in southern Iraq looking for work within the last 3 months. 36 This anecdotal fact may be very telling in that outsiders now Some Iraqis have begun to attend sporting events in recent months. 37 This intuitive fact may be an indicator of not only a safer environment but also the development of free time. Leisure activities can signal both a change in mood and priorities. Although probably not a prime indicator on a stand alone basis it most certainly is very telling when combined with other indicators. When people feel safe enough to gather in large groups it is a sign that in their eyes that security in that time and place is adequate for their personal safety. Pre-war attendance levels can be compared to a number of public gatherings to compare progress.
Success may in fact breed success in that when people see others exercising the freedom to assemble they may in fact join.
Attendance at educational institutions is also a very telling sign. Parents do not send their children to school unless two critical factors are taken into account. First, the parents must feel that the school environment and the transportation route to and from the school are safe. Second, the parents must feel that the education will be of value to the child and his or her family in the future. At the very basic level education deals with the expectations.
Attendance at school is one of the easier metrics to measure and it really goes to the heart of Iraqi expectations about the future. The World Bank estimates that 2.2 billion to 2.9 billion dollars are needed to rebuild and rehabilitate existing primary and secondary schools and purchase needed textbooks and supplies. 38 There is currently no funding for higher education and technical schools. 39 Small amounts of seed money invested in the Iraqi educational system could pay huge dividends in the future. The expectation of a better educated generation in the future has driven many societies to put a high value on making sure the environment is conducive to learning.
Another very telling indicator of domestic environmental improvement is the building and rebuilding of homes. People do not spend a large part of their income and effort to build a dwelling which they think will be destroyed or damaged. Permits for new homes or even major home repair can be tracked. It should be very easy to analyze where Iraqis are building new homes or are choosing to repair an existing home. There may be a tipping point where Iraqis feel that it is indeed time to invest in the future.
The level of crime inside Iraq can also be used to make to some general conclusions.
Saddam released almost all of the criminals from the Iraqi jails prior to the ending of major combat operations. 40 Many of these criminals have continued to commit crimes against Iraqi American deaths in country, could send out the wrong signal and tell the wrong story. There is a real danger that civilian decision makers or the news media could focus on one indicator and use that indicator to tell only one side of the story. It is also important that the long view be considered. The elementary schools being built today may not have an immediate impact in establishing a foundation for a strong economy but the groundwork for a better educated workforce will be seen years from now.
In the Middle East it is traditional for people to bring their issues or grievances to the head of the village or local clerics once a month. These meetings between the populace and their leaders could be excellent opportunities to gather valuable data. Issues could be discussed and analyzed in order to gain true objective and subjective data. Analysis needs to be made at the local level and also at the national level to establish overall and regional trends and moods. It does little good to state that the aggregate unemployment level in Iraq was reduced by 1.4% on 6 April 2005 when in the Sunni Triangle of the state the actual unemployment rose by 5%. 44 Because the rebuilding of Iraq is such a highly politicized endeavor it will be more important than ever to make sure the proper information and data is thoroughly analyzed to tell the whole story so that the decision maker understands the issues. 
